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THE PRESENT STATUS OF
MISCEGENATION STATUTES
EDMUND L. WALTON, JR.

With the influx of so called "civil rights" cases in recent
years it seems that a reappraisal of state legislation and constitutional prohibitions concerning intermarriage of persons of
different races is in order.
A total of twenty-four states currently have prohibitions
against miscegeneous marriages,1 fourteen more have repealed
such laws, 2 and the supreme courts of two states have held
that their miscegenation statutes are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,3 but one
of these reversed itself five years later. 4 The highest courts of
twelve other" states have affirmed the constitutionality of their
respective statutes. s The Supreme Court of the United States
has once had the opportunity to rule upon the question in
recent years but sidestepped the issue. 6
ALA. CONST., art. IV, § 102; ALA. CODE tic. 14, § 360 (1940); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN., § 25-101 (1956); ARK. STAT. § 55-104 (1947); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1930); FLA. CONST. arc. 16, § 24; FLA. STAT. §741.11
(1955); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-106 (1935); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-206
(1948); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1952); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
402.020 (1955); LA. REV. STAT. § 14-79 (1950); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27,
§ 398 (1957); MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263; MISS. CODE ANN. § 459 (1942);
MO. REV. STAT. § 451.020 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-103 (1943);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.180 (1957); N. C. CONST. art. XIV, § 8; N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1950) (1953); OLKA. STAT. tit. 43, § 12 (1951); S. C.
Const. art. 3, § 33; S. C. CODE § 20-7 (1952); TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 14;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-402 (1956); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4607
(1925); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54
(1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4701 (1) (1955); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-18
(1957).
2 Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode
Island, the state of Washington, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oregon,
Colorado, and Montana.
3 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948); Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195
(1872).
4 Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
5 State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16. 121 P.2d 882 (1942); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31
S.W. 977 (1875); Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124
P.2d 240 (1942); Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321 (1869); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind.
389 (1871); State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So.2d 233 (1959); Miller v. Lucks,
203 Miss. 824, 36 So.2d 140 (1948); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 174 (1883);
State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231
P. 483 (1924); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871); Nairn v. Naim, 197 Va. 80,
87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
8 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
1
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The statutes, while varied in scope and legal consequences
for violation are unanimous in condemning marriage between
Negroes and whites. Three representative statutes are those of
Virginia,7 Maryland, 8 and Arkansas. 1 Both Maryland and Virginia have criminal penalties as well as civil prohibitions and
both declare the parties to a miscegenous marriage to be
felons. o Arkansas declares such a marriage to be illegal and
void."1 Virginia prohibits the marriage of whites with colored
persons; 1 2 Arkansas, white persons with Negroes or mulattoes; 13 and Maryland forbids any intermarriage between members of the white, Negro or Malayan races.' 4 Virginia
describes a "white person" as one with no other admixture of
blood other than white or one-sixteenth or less American
Indian blood. 15
The challenge of the constitutionality of these and other
state miscegenation statutes has been made and met in the
state courts, 6 but as yet the United States Supreme Court has
not seen fit to make a final judgment. What are the major
factors to be discussed and when will the court meet the challenge?
Marriageas a Creatureof the State
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people. 17
Upon this foundation the states have built a tremendous
body of law. Every state of the fifty United States has legislation governing capacity of its domiciliaries to marry. The
7

VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1950).
8 MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27, § 398 (1957).
9 ARK. STAT. ANN., § 55-104 (1947).
2o

Note 9, rupra;VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59.

11 Note 9, supra.
12 VA. CODE ANN., § 20-54.
1' Note 9, supra.
14 Note 8, supra.

15 Note 12, supra.
16 Note 7, supra.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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interpretation of this legislation is the task of the supreme
courts of the various states.'"
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life,
as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution has always been subject to
the control of the (state) legislatures.91
As Chief Justice Marshall stated in the famous case of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward:20
All our marriage and divorce laws.., are state laws and
state statutes; the national power with us not having legislative or judicial cognizance of the matter within these
localities.
That marriage is under the general control of the state cannot be disputed, but do miscegenation statutes violate the
Fourteenth Amendment? The answer to this question has not
been made clear by the United States Supreme Court. In
Meyer v. Nebraska,21 the court said:
The liberty thus guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.., denotes the right of the individual. . . to marry
...and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. (Emphasis added.)
Yet, an earlier pronouncement, more directly in point, by
the same body said:
Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may
be said in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of
contract, and yet have been universally recognized as within
22
the police power of the state.
18 Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877).

10 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887).
4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819).

20
21

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

22

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1895). This case was overruled as to the
..separate but equal" doctrine by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), which relied upon changing conditions in the field of education as
justification.
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The precise question has never been discussed by the
Supreme Court; thus authority of the state and lower federal
courts remains the only guide as to the question of constitutionality. These decisions have been almost unanimous in
declaring miscegenation statutes within the control of the
states and outside the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 3
Extension of the Fourteenth Amendment
In recent years the fourteenth amendment has been given
ever widening application in decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. In areas once deemed the private preserves of
the state legislatures, the court has found violations of the
sacred precepts of "equal protection" and "due process".
The most recent major decision in this category is Baker v.
Carr,24 in which the Supreme Court applied the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to state reapportionment legislation. This was the initial invasion into the apportionment field, heretofore solely controlled by the states. The
most widely known decision and that having had the widest
repercussions, of course, was the case of Brown v. Board of
Education,25 in which the public schools which had been
governed solely by the states were ordered desegregated. In
this decision the "separate but equal" test of Plessyv. Ferguson26
was rejected, Mr. ChiefJustice Warren stating that separate but
equal facilities in public schools could not in fact exist.
Another of the more notable recent cases in this area is the
momentous decision of Mapp v. Ohio 2 reversing Wolf v.
Colorado.2 8 This case, by means of the fourteenth amendment,
extended the illegal search and seizure provisions of the fourth
amendment to the state courts. Numerous other decisions in
the field of civil rights have been handed down in recent years.
It would not be a long step to extend the reasoning prevalent
in these cases to the miscegenation situation.
23

24
25
26
27
28

See note 7 supra;Ex Parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 699 (No. 5047) (C.C. W.D. Tex.
1879); In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6550) (C.C. N.D. Ga. 1871); Ex
Parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cas. 602 (No. 7825) (C.C. E.D. Va. 1879); Statev.
Tutty, 41 F. 753 (1890); Stevens v. U.S., 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cit. 1944).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163 U.S. 537 (1895),
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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Defense of Miscegenation Statutes
The argument for the constitutionality of miscegenation
statutes is that the establishment of marriage is one historically
governed by the states and protected from federal interference
by the police power of the state. Thus, in Reynolds v. United
States,29 a conviction for bigamy was allowed to stand despite a
conflict with religious principles of the accused which encouraged polygamous marriages. A general, valid, public policy
opposing polygamous marriages gave the state (or in this case a
territory), the right to legislate against such marriages as a
valid exercise of the police power. The existence of the police
power of the states under the Constitution is not controverted.
The major question to be decided is whether miscegenation
statutes serve a valid public purpose.
Miscegenation statutes were enacted to prevent theamalgamation of the races, to preserve racial integrity. The Supreme
Court has never passed on this particular subject, but it has
passed on numerous occasions on the broader topic of the
validity of a public purpose to separate the races from social
contact. In the field of public education, as has been noted,
segregation has been fully rejected. 30 The Supreme Court in
1958 while unanimously reaffirming Brown v. Board of Education,31 quoted Buchanan v. Warley32 as follows:
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote
the public peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as
this is, and important as is the preservation of the public
peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the
Federal Constitution.
The case quoted, concerning municipal statutes restricting
certain residential areas as to race, stated that the statutes could
not be upheld because it furthers the public policy 33 based on
the undesirability of miscegenation.
29

98 U.S. 145 (1878).

30 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
3 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
32 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).

33

Ibid.
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The Supreme Court has moved forward, without exception,
striking down public policy arguments whenever racial issues
have been involved. State and Federal courts may not enforce
private agreements to exclude persons of a designated race
from use or occupancy of residential real estate. 3 4 In the recent
"sit-in" cases, the court decided that the public policy of the
state to discourage inter-racial mixing in restaurant facilities a
and bus terminals3 6 in itself was insufficient to sustain convictions of demonstrators for disturbing the peace. The Court
disapproved of enforced segregation in public beach and bathhouse facilities being a proper exercise of the police power.3 7
State statutes denying colored and white boxers the right to
appear on the same card have been declared unconstitutional, 8
In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,3 9 it was held that a
privately managed restaurant in a building, partially constructed
with public funds, could not refuse service to a customer
because of race.
The instances in the preceding two paragraphs, with one
exception, involved state statutes, the purpose of which was to
prevent the mixing of the races. The one exception involved
judicial enforcement of individual contracts. 40 All had a basis
of public policy declared by the states to be a valid exercise of
the police power. In all of the cases the public policy argument
was declared not to have a valid public purpose.
Thus the effectiveness of a public policy argument in
defense of miscegenation statutes stands on very weak ground
today. The mind of the modern Supreme Court was well
expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in Shelley v. Kraemer,
when he stated: "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of equalities." 41
3' Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947); Hurd v. Lodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
35 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
36 Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 156 (1962).
37 Dawson v. Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955); af'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
38 Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission, 168 F. Supp. 149 (1958); af'd, 359 U.S.
533 (1958).
39 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
40 See note 35 supra.
41 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1947).
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Hesitancy of the Supreme Court to Hear Miscegenation Cases
The first case involving a miscegenation statute to reach the
United States Supreme Court and the only one to be decided on
the merits to date was Pace v. Alabama.42 This case was tried
under an indictment charging the defendants, a white and a
Negro, with cohabitation in violation of the Alabama Code.
The Code provided heavier penalties for inter-racial cohabitation than for the same offense between members of the
same race. The court speaking through Mr. Justice Field in
ruling the statute constitutional, said:
Indeed, the offense.., cannot be committed without
involving the persons of both races in the same punishment
...The punishment of each offending person, whether
43
white or black, is the same.
While the question decided did not directly involve marriage
between the races and has been so distinguished, 4 the principle
involved has been abundantly cited by state and federal courts
in upholding such statutes. 4
The Supreme Court has once granted certiorari to a case
directly involving an invalidated miscegeneous marriage. In
Naim v. Naim,40 an annulment action, the plaintiff declared the
marriage invalid under the Virginia Code 47 since the marriage
was between a Chinese and a white person. The Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had ruled that the Virginia statute
did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.4 s The United
States Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings
to determine the relationship of the parties to the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
thereupon stated that it had no machinery for such a remand
and then affirmed its prior decision. 4 9 The United States
42

106 U.S. 583 (1882).

43

Id. at 585.

44 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).

45 See note 24, supra.
46 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
47 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1950).
48

Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).

49 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
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35

Supreme Court then refused the motion to recall the mandate
stating that the Virginia decision left the case devoid of a
properly presented federal question.5O The Supreme Court
had denied certiorari to a case involving an Alabama miscegenation statute only a few months earlier. s'
In summary, the weight of authority is in favor of the
constitutionality of miscegenation statutes.
It would be
unrealistic, however, to conclude that this state of affairs will
remain static in light of the United States Supreme Court's
growing tendency to extend the applicability of the equal
protection clause to matters formerly considered as solely state
questions.
50 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
521Jackson v. State, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).

